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ABSTRACT
In 2009 an estimated 52,000 tonnes of precious wood from ca. 
100,000 rosewood and ebony trees was logged in north - east 
Madagascar, one third originating from Marojejy National Park 
and its environs, the remainder from in and around Masoala 
National Park. At least 500,000 additional trees and many miles 
of vines were cut to make rafts to transport the heavy ebony and 
rosewood logs. Approximately 36,700 tonnes were shipped in 
1,187 containers, almost all to China, for a total export sale price 
estimated at $ US 220 million. In the SAVA region, members of 
the timber syndicate pocketed 76 %  of this whereas the State 
collected just $ US 15.3 million. Of the three main companies 
that transported rosewood from Vohemar, Delmas benefited 
most; three banks also facilitated the illegal timber trade. Fraud 
is perpetrated by the syndicate and government administrators 
along every step in Madagascar’s precious timber trade in a 
coordinated effort to maximize profit and minimize taxes and 
fines. Poor governance and a lack of clarity in forest regulation 
have facilitated timber trafficking and undermined judicial con-
trol; during at least three periods (1992, 2006 and 2009 - 2010) 
escalation of rosewood exportation has been facilitated by 
government decrees issued prior to elections or during difficult 
political times, in each instance accompanied by ‘exceptional’ 
government orders allowing a few powerful operators to export 
massive quantities of wood – all part of a carefully orchestrated 
cycle. The near-silence of donors and NGOs is linked to their 
loss of influence following suspension of all but humanitarian 
aid since 17 March 2009.
RÉSUMÉ
La campagne 2009 de bois précieux à Madagascar représente 
au minimum 52 000 tonnes de bois précieux abattu, venant 
de 100 000 arbres de bois de rose et d’ébène dont plus de 
60 000 situés dans les aires protégées, ce qui représente au 
minimum 4 000 hectares de parc et 10 000 hectares de forêt 
intacte non - classée ayant fait l’objet d’une coupe sélective. Le 
bois de rose provient de la région du Marojejy pour un tiers, 
et de celle du Masoala pour les deux autres tiers. Plus de 
500 000 autres arbres et des dizaines de milliers de lianes 
ont été coupées pour faciliter le transport du bois précieux. 
Environ 36 700 tonnes de bois précieux ont été exportées dans 
1 187 conteneurs à destination de la Chine (50 tonnes d’ébène 
vers l’Allemagne) pour un prix de vente estimé à 220 millions 
Rosewood of Madagascar: Between democracy 
and conservation
Hery Randriamalala and Zhou Liu Correspondence:
Hery Randriamalala
E - mail: hery.randriamalala@gmail.com
de dollars, dont près de la moitié est réalisée à l’exportation 
au départ de Vohémar dans la SAVA. Les 22 exportateurs ont 
réalisé 76 %  de bénéfice sur ce chiffre. Le premier bénéficiaire 
individuel de ces exportations est l’État malgache (15,3 millions 
de dollars de recettes). La fraude pour l’ensemble de la filière 
est évaluée à 4,6 millions de dollars. Le montant des devises 
non rapatriées pourrait s’élever à 52 millions de dollars. Alors 
que la réglementation prévoyait 13 exportateurs agréés, 23 ont 
exporté. Des trois compagnies maritimes qui ont participé à 
cette activité, Delmas est celle qui en a le plus profité. Trois 
banques ont soutenu les exportations. 
À au moins trois reprises (1992, 2006 et 2009 - 2010), 
l’exploitation du bois de rose a été facilitée par le pouvoir 
peu avant des élections importantes. L’impact sur les aires 
protégées est un amoindrissement de leur biodiversité, une 
fragilisation du milieu aux atteintes naturelles ou humaines. La 
campagne de coupe de bois de rose est en partie responsable 
du recul de la fréquentation touristique (-56 % ) en 2009. Cette 
filière est un commerce inéquitable : la partie chinoise touche 
25 fois plus que la partie malgache et 357 fois plus que les 
villageois de la forêt. Le chaos de la réglementation forestière 
a facilité ce trafic. La responsabilité de la classe dirigeante dans 
la campagne 2009 est totale. Le quasi - silence des bailleurs de 
fonds est la conséquence de la suspension de toute aide autre 
qu’humanitaire après le 17 mars 2009, ce qui leur a enlevé toute 
influence. Depuis l’interdiction de coupe sur le territoire chinois, 
en 1998, les importations de bois en provenance des pays tropi-
caux et tempérés ont été multipliées par six. La Chine protège 
donc ses propres forêts en « exportant de la déforestation ». 
KEYWORDS: Illegal logging, Dalbergia, corruption, governance, 
China.
MOTS CLEFS : exploitation forestière illégale, Dalbergia, corrup-
tion, gouvernance, Chine.
INTRODUCTION
The oldest recorded rosewood exploitation in Madagascar 
dates to 1899 (Botokely 1902): Just three years after coloniza-
tion, a timber trader named Mr Cayeux sourced rosewood at 
Ratsiharanana, south of Antalaha, and exported 50 tonnes per 
month, while the company Vinany Be, operating farther south on 
the Masoala peninsula, exported far less – a total of 200 tonnes 
during 1900 and 1901.
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Alarming and uncontrolled trade in rosewood led to the 
Ministry of Water and Forests (MEF; for clarity ‘MEF’ is used to 
refer to the Ministry of Water and Forests, the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Forests, and any of the other names applied at various 
times to this Ministry) and the Ministry of Trade to issue a decree 
(11932 / 2000) prohibiting any export of unprocessed rosewood 
for three years (Stasse 2002). Issued on 20 November 2000, Order 
No. 12704 / 2000 called for a halt to extraction of timber in all 
designated protected areas as well as areas on their periphery. 
Furthermore, according to Article 4 of this order, no exceptions 
were to be granted. It is estimated that up to 87 %  of logging of 
all types of wood in the eastern coastal region is illegal (Eaux 
et Forêts, cited by Brodbeck 1999) and that 60 %  of rosewood 
logging is illegal (Stasse 2002). Precious timber harvested in the 
SAVA region before 14 September 2006 was done so illegally 
as permits were not in accordance with applicable laws and 
regulations, and timber harvested thereafter is illegal under 
Interministerial Order No. 16030 - 2006 (GW and EIA 2009).
The precious timber industry is cunningly organized: Inter-
national trade is frequently orchestrated by established trad-
ers holding an official export agreement or by the individuals 
and companies exploiting the forests. They pay independent 
woodcutters (i.e., local villagers or farmers) to fell trees, both 
within and outside officially approved lots, or in areas where the 
authorities have issued permits for logging companies to exploit 
timber and other forest products. But villagers cut trees where 
they are easiest to access and drag to transport points, regard-
less of whether they are in the delineated forest lots or outside 
the borders of protected areas (such as Masoala National Park), 
and after years of extensive exploitation, larger trees of rose-
wood (Dalbergia spp.) have become rare (Stasse 2002).
Working under an operating licence issued to a trader or 
timber company, woodcutters operate freely throughout the 
forest, with or without approval. Wood originating from outside 
designated lots is thus mixed in with legally sourced timber. The 
logging companies pay the collectors, who mark logs with the 
official forest hammer of the company, thereby legalizing the 
wood (Stasse 2002).
Order No. 13855 / 2001 issued by the MEF on 13 November 
2001 states in Article 30, paragraph 3, that “when a tree is felled 
and cut into logs, the ends must be marked with a hammer or 
paint to indicate the locality where the tree was felled”. Article 
37 states that “any timber removed from a site must be cut at 
each end and must contain information about the forestry oper-
ator and the officials of the Forestry Administration, which will 
officially receive the product”. According to Decree No. 98 / 782 
of 16 September 1998, under Law 97 / 107 of 08 August 1997 
(GW and EIA 2009), all products not conforming to the above 
regulations are considered illegal and should be confiscated.
In March 2009, the National Parks of the SAVA region were 
invaded by thousands of woodcutters during a period of intense, 
illegal logging activity that lasted at least six to eight weeks. The 
woodcutters removed previously cut trees and felled more trees. 
In north - eastern Madagascar, rosewood occurs primarily within 
and adjacent to Marojejy, Masoala and Mananara National Parks. 
Valuable timber species are under severe pressure in all these 
forests, regardless of whether they fall within a protected area. 
Frenzied felling of rosewood was observed in the north - eastern 
sector of Masoala National Park in 2009. The transport of logs 
to Antalaha was conducted openly on stretches of road both 
north and south of town controlled by gendarmes, a fact that 
reflects a serious deterioration of the law and active collabora-
tion between the law enforcement agencies and illegal timber 
traders. A lack of supervision and control by the Forestry Admin-
istration over cutting, transportation and storage of rosewood 
is cause for grave concern (GW and EIA 2009).
The year 2009 was exceptional for the rosewood industry in 
Madagascar, which, between political turmoil, abundant lobby-
ing and media campaigning, has had unprecedented interna-
tional exposure. In this article we aim to analyze the rosewood 
industry in Madagascar in the context of patterns of political 
events, government decrees, and illegal logging activities. We 
will outline the processes and mechanisms of the rosewood 
trade, from the sourcing of the timber to the local and regional 
exporters, through shipping and exporting, to the buyers and 
end users of the timber.
METHODOLOGY
DATA COMPILATION. Our survey was conducted over a 
period of one year, starting in February 2009 as intense 
logging began in the protected areas of the SAVA region. Partici-
pants and observers from all sectors of the industry, alarmed by 
the magnitude of what was happening, provided us with docu-
ments including permits, minutes, statements and contracts, 
issued amongst others by officials from MEF, the Customs and 
Justice services, banks, shipping companies and exporters.
We conducted a survey by interviewing people involved 
in the exploitation and trade of rosewood, including public 
officers, woodcutters, port agents, travellers who visited the 
region, residents of the towns of Andapa, Vohemar, Sambava, 
Antalaha, Maroantsetra and Mananara, passengers on ships 
sailing between Toamasina and Antalaha, tourist guides and 
Madagascar National Parks (MNP) agents based at Marojejy and 
Masoala, tourists and journalists returning from the parks, bank 
employees, and two exporters based in Antalaha. For safety 
reasons, interviewees who have requested anonymity are 
quoted as ‘anonymous’. Mention a company’s name indicates 
that we are in possession of documents to support statements. 
Where we are not in direct possession of relevant documenta-
tion, we cite the facts, but do not list names of the individuals 
or companies in question.
PARAMETERS AND DEFINITIONS. The parameters used
in this article are presented in Table 1. This article uses 
several key terms, defined as follows:
• Exporter (traders): Any person or company with consent 
(granted by the MEF) to export precious timber from 
Madagascar.
• Buyer: Any person or company buying precious timber 
from Madagascar. The common practice is that a buyer 
visits the region to meet an exporter, examine the qual-
ity of the wood, check its weight and accept the mode 
of payment requested by the exporter.
• Bank: A financial institution which advances funds 
for harvesting wood and domiciles an export opera-
tion (obligatory under Malagasy regulations as a bank 
must ensure that the total amount on the invoice in 
hard currency is repatriated within a period of three 
months, after which the bank has another three 
months to exchange 90 %  of the hard currency with  
the Central Bank).
MADAGASCAR CONSERVATION & DEVELOPMENT VOLUME 5 | ISSUE 1 — JUNE 2010 PAGE 13 
• Shipping company: Any company that ships containers 
of precious wood for export from Madagascar. These 
companies make regular runs to Mayotte or Mauritius, 
where containers are gathered for shipping to their 
final destination.
• Tax: Charges levied on the exported precious timber. 
In addition to the forest fee / licence, which should 
indicate the quantity of wood that can be harvested 
in a given forest lot, the exporter must also pay a 
collection fee (currently $ US 0.25 / kg), an export fee  
(5 %  of the FOB price) and a ‘fine’ of $ US 36,000 per 
container (Table 1).
RESULTS
QUANTITIES. Based on our survey and the parameters
listed in Table 1, we calculated the total impact of the ille-
gal logging within the SAVA and Analanjirofo regions for the 
year 2009, as presented in Table 2. In addition to the estimated 
100,000 trees of rosewood (Dalbergia spp.) felled in these two 
regions, at least 500,000 additional trees (e.g., Dombeya spp.) 
were also cut to make rafts to float the heavy precious timber 
(on average five high buoyancy trees are required to float one 
rosewood or ebony log) and tens of thousands of vines have 
been cut to bind the rafts (GW and EIA 2009). Assuming that 
(i) timber stored in the region of Antalaha is from the neigh-
Parameters Unit Value
Weight, length, volumes
     External dimensions of a 20 Ft container m 6*2.4*2.6
     External dimensions of a 40 Ft container m 12.2*2.4*2.6
     Volume of a 20 Ft container m3 33
     Volume of a 40 Ft container m3 67
     Maximum net weight of a 20 Ft container in Vohemar (estimation based on the limitation of the lifting equip-
     ment at the port of Vohemar until February 2010)
tonnes 20
     Maximum net weight of a 20 Ft container in Toamasina (for a wood density of ca. 1.02) tonnes 33
     Maximum net weight of a 40 Ft container in Toamasina tonnes 67
Transportation costs
     Purchase and transportation of one ton of rosewood from the forest to Antalaha $ US 420
     Transportation of one container from Antalaha to Vohemar $ US 750
     Container packing per container $ US 20
     Dock work for one container in Vohemar $ US 250
     Transportation of one 20 Ft container to Hong Kong by UAFL $ US 1,875
     Transportation of one 20 Ft container to Hong Kong by Delmas $ US 2,030
     Transportation of one 40 Ft container to Hong Kong by Safmarine (estimation) $ US 3,500
Taxes
     Collection fee (redevance à la collecte) per kg from 28 I 2009 onwards (Interministerial order N. 003/2009) $ US 0.05
     Collection fee per kg from 21 IX 2009 onwards (Interministerial order N. 38244/2009) $ US 0.25
     Exportation fee for semi crafted wood from 2004 onwards (Interministerial order N. 17939/2004) on FOB
     price (Free On Board / Freight On Board - for a price which includes goods plus the services of loading
     those goods onto some vehicle or vessel at a named location)
FOB price 4.00 % 
     Exportation fee for crafted wood from 2004 onwards FOB price 1.50 % 
     Exportation fee for all types of wood from 21 IX 2009 onwards (Interministerial order N. 003/2009) FOB price 5.00 % 
     Fine per container from 30 July 2009 onwards (Decision N. 338/09/MEF/MI) $ US 36,000
Selling price of rosewood
     Real selling price per kg of rosewood in logs or lumber (plaquettes); The FOB selling prices in March 2009
     in Vohemar varied between five and six $ US per kg for class one timber. These prices reached $ US 10
     to 11 in early 2009. The FOB price for class two wood was $ US 3 - 4 per kg. To simplify calculations, we
     considered a mean price of $ US 6 per kg regardless of the monthly variation and classes
$ US 6
Banks
     Mean domiciliation cost per bill $ US 15
     Foreign exchange commission 0.50 % 
Forestry
     Mean density of rosewood 1.02
     Mean density of ebony 1.40
     Mean weight of a rosewood log with a diameter of 35 cm and a length of 2 m kg 196
     Number of logs obtained from a tree (min – max) 2 - 4
     Number of lumbers within a log (min – max) (Sentence N. 2617 passed on 28 July 2008 at Antalaha court) 3 - 5
     Number of rosewood trees per ha in protected areas (min – max) 3 - 5
TABLE 1. Parameters used in calculations (partly based on GW and EIA 2009, Stasse 2002, Parant et al. 1985; rate of exchange used for Malagasy Ariary = 
MGA: $ US1.00 = MGA 2,000)
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bouring Masoala Peninsula, and (ii) the wood stored between 
Sambava and Vohemar (excluding that currently stored in Vohe-
mar awaiting export) originated from Marojejy and the banks 
of the Bemarivo River, we infer the following breakdown of the 
geographical origin of harvested timber: 64 %  from Masoala NP, 
and 36 %  from Marojejy NP and the Bemarivo watersheds.
The figures in Table 2 on the number of containers loaded 
with precious wood exported in 2009 are applicable to Vohemar 
and Toamasina. From March to September 2009, an average of 
one vessel per day left Maroantsetra and another from Manan-
ara bound for Toamasina, accounting for the daily shipment of 
50 tonnes of timber. After October 2009, the rate declined to 
one vessel per week, with two or three boats departing weekly 
from Antalaha. Stasse (2002) estimated that Toamasina has 
been the main port for the export of rosewood from Madagas-
car. A major litchi exporter shipped 300 containers of rosewood 
from there during this period (Toamasina port official pers. 
comm.). Given the number of shipments observed between 
Anta laha and Toamasina, we deduce that  the 300 
containers reportedly shipped from there were of the larger 
40-foot size (totalling ca. 20,000 tonnes). Of the 36,700 
tonnes exported, only 249 (0.7 % ) were of ebony and the 
remainder of rosewood.
Unit Total quantity Exportation
Total weight Tonnes 52,000 36,730
Total number of logs 300,000 187,600
Estimated number of trees 100,000
Estimated area impacted ha 4,000 – 10,000
Number of beams exported 74,250
Number of containers 1,187
Selling price $ US 220,000,000
Taxes ($ US 1.-- = MGA 2,000) $ US 21,900,000
The time scale diagram in Figure 1 shows monthly rose-
wood trade activity at the port of Vohemar as compared with the 
publication of government notes and orders. Activity peaked in 
February - March 2009, while the central government was almost 
completely dysfunctional (Débois 2009). 
In 2000 - 2001 and just prior to political turmoil in 2002, 
rosewood exports amounted to almost 5,000 tonnes annu-
ally, declining to almost nothing for 5 - 6 years, and increas-
ing again starting in 2007 (when 2,385 tonnes were shipped). 
Exports then escalated to almost 14,000 tonnes in 2008 (prior to 
the current political turmoil) and during the exceptional activity 
of 2009 they increased further to more than 36,000 tonnes. The 
figures presented for 2007 and 2008 mostly pertain to rose-
wood seized by the state and sold by auction to a single buyer 
(Anonymous 2008a). In addition, the inventory of 03 June 2009 
compiled by the Forestry Administration (concerning tonnage 
of precious timber shipped after that date from Vohemar along 
with various additional reports of stocks) shows a reserve of 
15,600 tonnes awaiting export.
Undoubtedly there are many additional caches of precious 
timber remaining concealed in forests, buried on beaches, 
hidden in shallow ocean waters, submerged in rivers and 
in rice paddies, or stashed under houses and in covered 
depots (Débois 2009). As we are unable to estimate the 
tonnage of such caches, however, we have ignored them 
in our analyses and our results thus offer a conservative 
evaluation of the current situation. 
PLAYERS IN THE ROSEWOOD TRADE. Exporters: Until
September 2009, 13 exporters were involved in the rose-
wood trade, concentrated in Antalaha, a situation that changed 
significantly with the publication of Order No. 38244 /  2009 on 
21 September 2009, which increased the total number of indi-
viduals or companies authorized to export precious timber to 
23 between September and December 2009. This order was 
accompanied by noticeable encouragement for the creation of 
TABLE 2. Logging of precious timber in Madagascar during 2009.
FIGURE 1. Timetable of monthly exports of precious wood from Vohemar in 2009.
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new companies to export timber, not just from the SAVA region 
but also from the capital city of Antananarivo.
By multiplying the tonnage exported by each exporter by 
the estimated price received ($ US 6 /  kg), and then deducting 
taxes and miscellaneous other charges, we have attempted 
to estimate the profit made by the exporters. The true profit 
obtained by the exporters is, however, likely significantly higher 
that what we have estimated because it appears that in many 
cases Chinese buyers rather than the exporters have paid the $ 
US 36,000 ‘fine’ per container levied by the Administration since 
September 2009 (GW and EIA 2009). To put these numbers into 
perspective, we calculated the share received by the govern-
ment (through taxes levied only in the SAVA, because those paid 
in Toamasina are very difficult to estimate – see below on fraud 
and fines) and the share going to the villagers (woodcutters 
and porters, estimating their number at 5,000). We used these 
figures to calculate the total revenue for the SAVA alone in 2009, 
which we estimated at $ US 92,517,500, with the State collecting 
a total of $ US 15,311,000 (16.5 % ), the 22 exporters operating 
in the region pocketing more than $ US 70,734,000 (76.5 % , the 
three main exporters accounting for almost half of this, with 
just a little more than $ US 15,155,000 for Ets Ranjanoro, $ US 
9,819,000 for Ste Thunam Roger et Cie. and $ US 8,863,000 for 
Laisoa Jean - Pierre) and the villagers receiving an average of 
just $ US 1,300 each (or 7.0 %  of the total for the estimated 
5,000 persons involved).
The three exporters who received the best return on their 
investment (i.e., net profit / gross profit) are Ets Ranjanoro (97 % ), 
Laisoa Jean-Pierre (97 % ) and Bezokiny Christian Claude (96 % ). 
Probably because they are the most experienced companies in 
the business, they exported little or no timber after July 2009, 
the date on which the ‘fines’ were imposed. The three export-
ers who received the highest return per amount sold (profit / kg 
exported) are Laisoa Jean-Pierre ($ US 5.38 / kg), Ets Ranjanoro ($ 
US 5.35 / kg) and Bezokiny Christian Claude ($ US 5.28 / kg). The 
explanation is the same as for return on investment, although Ets 
Ranjanoro and Laisoa Jean - Pierre employed a method that differs 
from that used by other traders: They exported numerous squared 
logs in February and March 2009, thereby reducing empty space 
by packing the containers more efficiently, optimizing quantity 
per container and thus reducing cost per volume shipped.
Banks: Three local banks have supported the export of 
rosewood: Bank of Africa (BOA), BNI - Crédit Lyonnais (BNI - CL), 
and BFV - Société Générale (BFV - SG). Note that BOA sharehold-
ers include the Agence Française de Développement (French 
Development Agency), the World Bank Group (through the Inter-
national Finance Corporation), the Netherlands Development 
Finance Company, and the Banque Marocaine du Commerce 
Extérieur (Moroccan Bank of Foreign Trade).
Bank domiciliation: In order to control the compulsory 
repatriation of foreign currency to Madagascar, the Ministry of 
Finance requires bank certification that a local exporter has a 
foreign currency account in one of its branches. Certification 
is required for each separate transaction. Before wood can be 
shipped, exporters thus must pay for logging, transport and 
storage, and the banks provide them with necessary financial 
resources for this. Transactions with the 23 currently authorized 
exporters enabled the three banks to make profits of no less 
than the following amounts: BOA (ca. $ US 98,000), BNI - CL ($ US 
32,000) and BFV-SG ($ US 22,000).
Shipping companies: The difficulties of land transport on 
and around the Masoala Peninsula, due to poor or nonexistent 
roads, stimulated domestic shipping by water as a means of 
moving harvested rosewood. The timber cut in the Mananara 
National Park and in Makira Natural Park, as well as in the 
southern part of Masoala, is primarily transported by boat to 
Toamasina, occasionally to Antalaha. Wood from the northern 
sector of Masoala is usually moved along trails to Antalaha, 
or sometimes by ship to Toamasina. Timber extracted from 
Marojejy is consistently transported by road to the ports of 
Vohemar or Antsiranana.
Three international shipping companies have transported 
containers of rosewood from three ports to Asia, as follows: 
(1) from Vohemar: UAFL and its subsidiary Spanfreight, Delmas 
(a subsidiary of the CMA - CGM group), and Safmarine; (2) from 
Toamasina: Delmas, Safmarine, and PIL Shipping; and (3) from 
Antsiranana: Delmas, Safmarine and MSC. Only UAFL, Safmarine 
and Delmas transported precious wood in 2009 from Vohemar. 
Based on the parameters indicated in Table 1, these compa-
nies had the following share (number of containers × fee per 
container): Delmas (ca. $ US 1,285,000), UAFL (ca. $ US 220,000) 
and Safmarine (ca. $ US 120,000). 
Safmarine transported 32 40 - foot containers in February 
and March 2009 from Toamasina (Safmarine to Schuurman In 
litt.), but the following month they elected to stop all shipment 
of precious timber from Madagascar for an indefinite period. 
UAFL was made aware in October 2009 of the origin and legally 
dubious nature of the timber they were transporting, as well 
as the environmental damage that the illicit logging industry 
causes (UAFL to Schuurman In litt.). They voluntarily stopped 
transporting rosewood after a final shipment on 30 October 2009 
on board the Mauritius.
Buyers: In 2001, 98 %  of precious timber exported from Mada-
gascar went to China (Stasse 2002), and in 2009 the figure was 
almost 100 % , the sole exception being a small quantity of ebony 
sent to Germany and Mauritius. In 2005 China imported a total of 
29.4 million m3 of timber as logs, ca. two thirds of which originated 
from Siberia and 25 %  (7.4 million m3) from tropical forests (Canby 
et al. 2008). Most of this wood is used for manufacturing furniture 
that is exported to developed countries. Until 2008, Cameroon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of Congo accounted 
for 14 %  of Chinese imports of raw timber (Naidu et al. 2008), with 
significantly less originating from Madagascar.
Chinese customs regulations utilise various classifica-
tion codes for different forms or types of timber: 44039930 
(logs), 94035010 (bedroom furniture) and 94036010 (other 
furniture). Rosewood trimmed into beams is declared under 
a different code, but is often mixed in with the other types 
of timber. For example, under the code for logs imported 
from Madagascar, Chinese customs lists 4,000 tonnes per 
year during 2000-2002, 3,000 tonnes in 2004, 4,000 tonnes 
in 2005, 8,000 tonnes in 2006, no imports in 2007, and 1,000 
 tonnes in 2008 (James Hewitt In litt.), far less than the amounts 
known to be exported from Madagascar. 
FOREST REGULATION. Many observers have already
described the disjointed development of forest regulation 
in Madagascar (see Ballet and Rahaga 2009, GW and EIA 2009). 
Even the exporters complain that constantly changing regulations 
constitute a series of red and green lights. Figure 2 provides a 
graphic representation of regulation from 1974 to 2009.
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DISCUSSION
Fraud has taken place along every step in the rosewood 
trade. Below we first discuss how the traders circumvent 
government taxation. We then analyze possible forces 
behind the trade, and conclude with commentary on the 
socio - economic impact and ecological consequences of the 
illegal rosewood trade.
REDUCING OR AVOIDING TAXATION. Origin of wood: 
Cyclones regularly strike Madagascar, and these natural disasters 
can impact the economy of affected areas. The Government has 
FIGURE 2. Progression of forestry regulation and political events from 1974 to 2009 (a), during Ratsiraka (1974-1993 & 1996-2002) and Zafy periods (1993-
1996) (b), during Ravalomanana period (c) and during Rajoelina period (d), with major cyclones shown from 1994 onwards. (Forestry regulation have been 
calculated by applying indices to strength of legal texts – from 8 = Ordinance to 1 = communiqué; applicability, clarity and functional extent of these legal 
texts – from 4 = remarkable to 1 = weak; wood targeted – rosewood and ebony =5, palissandre = 1; precious wood harvesting – forbidden = -5, fixed quota 
= 1, allowed = 5; transportation of precious wood – forbidden = -10, fixed quota = 1, allowed = 10; exportation of precious wood – forbidden = -20, fixed 
quota = 15, limited to a single type = 10, allowed = 20; taxes – generated = -1, increased = -2; these indices have been standardized between 100 – any-
thing allowed in the forest, and -100 – everything is forbidden in the forest. Cyclones have been shown on the graphics, graded by intensity – Very Intense 
Tropical, Intense Tropical and Tropical (Service de la Météorologie 2000, World Meteorological Organization 2008). Elections have been differentiated and 
graded – presidential, general or referendum (African Elections Database 2010).
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on several occasions honoured requests from timber traders to 
recover trees felled by cyclones for export (e.g., Interministerial 
Order No. 11832 / 2000 following Cyclone Hudah in April 2002). 
However, field investigations have shown that the majority 
of trees exported following the passage of a cyclone had not 
been uprooted by this hurricane but rather were intentionally 
felled (Stasse 2002, GW and EIA 2009). The United Nations (Joint 
UNEP / OCHA Environmental Team 2007, cited by GW and EIA 
2009) and Birkinshaw and Randrianjanahary (2007) showed that 
hurricanes have had little effect on trees at Masoala, especially 
on large, long - lived individuals that are resilient and have 
survived many severe cyclones. A concrete example of how false 
information in this regard has been used involves the company 
Betsiaroana Jean Galbert, who sourced a large amount of 
rosewood in a concession near Ambohitralalana, Masoala, under 
license number 842 / MEF / SG / DGEF / DIREF.201  / C.04/02/03 
dated 8 August 2000, which expired on 14 August 2003. The 
technical minutes included in the final post - logging report (No 
12 / MINENVEF / CIREEF. 202 / Col dated 26 May 2006) state “(…) 
after successive hurricanes tearing into the concession, we 
noted that the following trees have been uprooted: 28 hazinina, 
(…), 243 Rosewood, 23 bois d�ébène (ebony), 39 Nanto [for a 
total of 420 trees]”. According to these numbers, the company 
claims that cyclones apparently felled mostly rosewood trees 
but these figures seem totally unrealistic as Dalbergia are 
certainly among the most cyclone - resistant trees in Madagascar 
and their natural population density is far less than the 58 % 
reported here for uprooted trees.
A decade ago more than 60 %  of rosewood was taken 
from national parks, and operational documentation such as 
logging permits, transportation manifests, storage records and 
export documentation does not comply with applicable laws 
(Stasse 2002). Our current estimate that 64 %  of wood exported 
in 2009 is sourced from Masoala and 36 %  from Marojejy 
clearly shows that a majority of wood is now being illegally 
extracted from Masoala.
Weight issue: Stasse (2002: 8) indicated “When loggers 
perform weighing – with or without the exporter present – they 
report the number of logs and the tonnage, accounting for the 
whole lot. At the port during loading, customs check the number 
of logs, but not the tonnage declared. The number of tonnes 
is often undervalued to reduce accrued liabilities, the latter 
being applied to the tonnage shipped.” The port of Vohemar 
does not have a weighbridge capable of weighing single logs 
or a container. Customs officials therefore rely on exporter 
declarations to calculate the weight of a container, which is 
obtained by summing up the weight of logs reported by the 
exporters using scales on their own premises. Interestingly, all 
cargo manifests from Vohemar list logs with the exactly same 
weight, 200 kg per log. Basing our calculations on a maxi-
mum weight of 20 tonnes per container (Table 1), and taking 
into account the tax increase from $ US 0.05 to $ US 0.25 / 
kg effective from 21 September 2009, irregularities on the collec-
tion of fees are estimated to total as much as $ US 186,000. It is 
possible that our calculations based on the size of the logs are 
not fully accurate if the weights declared on the cargo manifests 
are also false (and therefore undervalued), in which case tax 
evasion is taking place rather than ‘forest fraud’.
Another error has been found systematically in all documen-
tation stating the amount to be charged for export. These forms 
list an estimate of volume, to which the taxes will be applied, 
taken from the declared weight on customs forms. Remarkably, 
these errors, which average $ US 15 per tonne for rosewood, 
are always in favour of the exporter. The total amount of fraud 
during 2009 for the known amounts exported can therefore be 
estimated at about $ US 550,000 (Table 2).
Smuggling: Stasse (2002) estimated that 40 %  of the volume 
exported at that time was smuggled out of Madagascar. In 2009, 
apart from the 12 containers seized on the Lea in October, the 
only evidence that we have found of smuggling is as follows: A 
reference to the shipment of 15 containers without documents 
in March 2009 from Vohemar (Andriatahina and Rakotondrabe 
2009), and a survey by Missouri Botanical Garden (2009) report-
ing that between 03 February 2009 and 28 March 2009, 469 
containers left the country without being reported (and there-
fore were not included in the total exports listed in Table 2). 
As we are not in a position to substantiate these figures due 
to the secretive nature of smuggling, the numbers in Table 2 
must be regarded as the only reliable data currently available, 
providing a conservative estimate.
Repatriation of foreign currencies: Export of rosewood from 
Madagascar can only be carried out with permission from the 
Government. The official FOB price, set by the Government at 
€ 2,000 / m3, is used to calculate the exportation fee (Table 1). 
The repatriation of foreign currencies imposed by the Govern-
ment applies to the total amount of the invoice. The FOB prices 
we found on invoices from exporters in our possession are 
uniformly close to this amount. We know (see paragraph on 
settings) that while the actual price received for rosewood is 
usually around $ US 6 per kilogram (i.e., $ US 6,120 / m3, Table 
1), it can sometimes reach $ US 11 / kg ($ US 11,220 / m3). The 
lower price systematically indicated on invoices is thus used to 
reduce the amount of foreign currency that must be repatriated. 
Indeed, the bank stamps the invoice for each shipment issued 
the clearance and therefore must ensure that the total amount 
indicated in hard currency is returned to its accounts at the end 
of the export operation. The more an invoice is undervalued, 
the lower the amount of currency that must be repatriated to 
Madagascar and then sold to the Central Bank (90 %  of the total). 
Even in the unlikely event that the average price received did 
not exceed $ US 6 / kg, the total amount of foreign currency 
generated by rosewood sales in 2009 exceeded the amount 
required for repatriation by least $ US 52 million. By understating 
the weight reported for the calculation of export duties, the total 
amount on the invoice is reduced and consequently the amount 
to be repatriated is also reduced. Fraud thus adds up.
Fraud on fines: Interministerial order No. 38244 / 209 was 
signed on 21 September 2009 (Figure 1) to establish a compul-
sory payment prior to export of $ US 36,000 per contested 
container held in the port of Vohemar. This requirement could 
be regarded as a fine for the export of precious timber. This 
fine is then transferred to a reforestation fund that, however, 
has no legal basis. The enactment of this order points to a 
possible diversion of public funds at the highest levels of the 
State (GTZ 2009 In litt.).
Under this new system, exporters must pay $ US 36,000 
per container, precluding the possibility of fraud based on 
weight or price. However, the order opens a new loophole since 
it does not specify the capacity of a container, which differs 
by at least 12.6 tonnes between Vohemar and Toamasina 
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(Table 1). This may partly explain why large quantities of wood 
have been transported by boat from Antalaha to Toamasina, 
where export is more profitable because the port is able to 
accommodate heavier containers. An exporter from Antalaha 
went so far as to sell his ‘rights’ to export 25 containers, as 
conferred by the order of 21 September, giving the exporter in 
Toamasina the ability to ship an additional 1,131.5 tonnes of 
wood. Moreover, the Toamasina - based exporter in question is 
reported to pay just $ US 5,000 per container rather than the 
officially required $ US 36,000 (Anonymous 2009). In another 
example of fraud, two exporters each shipped 43 contain-
ers on the Lea on 4 October 2009, well after the new fiscal 
measures took effect on 21 September 2009, but their export 
fees were dated from April at the previous, lower rate, a differ-
ence of $ US 1.75 million. The case was tried in a Toamasina 
court on 11 November 2009 but we are not aware of the 
details of the decision.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FORCES. The MEF and MNP were
overwhelmed by the events described in the Introduction. 
In response, a new entity was established by the Ministry in 
September 2009 to overcome these problems, the Task Force. In 
order to appreciate the role of this Task Force, it is first neces-
sary to review the history of forest legislation in Madagascar.
The development of forest legislation and regulation in 
Madagascar: Figure 2 shows major trends in the development 
of forest regulation and confirms the impression of a succession 
of ‘green lights and red lights’, which can best be understood in 
relation to the terms of each of the country’s presidents. 
The period from 1974 to 1989 (Figure 2b) shows high stabil-
ity in forest legislation and its application. Forests were closed 
to loggers and there was little or no felling of trees. During this 
period of revolutionary dictatorship, rosewood export was low 
and irregular. The Soviets created a few isolated airfields, such 
as at Doany near Andapa, and transported a limited number 
of logs by air. Two interesting coincidences can be noted: In 
November 1992 the relaxation of legislation regulating the 
export of precious timber immediately preceded presidential 
elections held on 25 November and general elections the follow-
ing June; the easing of regulatory legislation again on 30 October 
2000, prohibiting logging in the forests except on the outskirts of 
Antalaha, where the cyclone Hudah struck in April 2000.
Figure 2c corresponds to the Ravalomanana presidency. 
During this period forests were opened to exploitation on 
several occasions: In September 2004 after Cyclone Gafilo the 
preceding March; on 14 September 2006, preceding the presi-
dential elections held on 03 December of that year; and just 
prior to a referendum held on April 2007. The destructive effect 
of the interministerial decree issued on 28 January 2009 (author-
izing export under so - called ‘exceptional’ circumstances for 
thirteen registered exporters) is also evident in Figure 2c. This 
situation was not improved by the 18 February note prohibiting 
the transportation and export of ebony and rosewood until an 
inventory of the total number of logs was completed, as political 
turmoil was reaching a peak.
Figure 2d, which corresponds to be period during which 
Rajoelina came to power, clearly shows a ‘sawtooth effect’ in the 
impact of regulations. The decision taken on 30 July 2009 author-
izing the export of 25 containers of rosewood for each of the 13 
operators recognised by Decree 003 - 2009 against payment of 
$ US 36,000 per container, followed by the decree of 21 Septem-
ber 2009 confirming permission to export of 25 containers of 
ebony and rosewood for each of the same traders, again with 
the payment of $ US 36,000 per container, was abruptly halted 
by Prime Minister Eugène Régis Mangalaza on 30 November 
2009 in a new order prohibiting the sourcing, transport and 
trade of precious timber.
His successor, Prime Minister Albert Camille Vital, swiftly 
changed the regulations to allow for logging once again. On 
31 December 2009, he issued a note with the same terms as 
the 21 September decree, but this time there was no deadline. 
According to our calculations, exports under this Order that 
have been reported to the State are worth $ US 13.65 million. 
In addition, there are still 200 containers awaiting shipping from 
Vohemar, but shipping companies have been reluctant to trans-
port wood from Madagascar following international pressure 
and condemnation of the illegal logging. Taxes on the wood 
held up in Vohemar potentially come to $ US 9.3 million, bring-
ing the total to almost $ US 23 million. However, the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Madame Cécile Manorohanta, declared on 18 
December 2009 that the elections announced by the President 
of Madagascar�s transition government and scheduled for 20 
March 2010 would cost nearly $ US 15 million (Maka 2009).
It is obvious that on at least three occasions (November 
1992, 14 September 2006, and 31 December 2009) restrictions 
on the trade of rosewood were relaxed just prior to impor-
tant elections, when funds would be needed and it would be 
advantageous not to offend voters in the regions where wood 
is exploited. This predictable, regular pattern strongly suggests 
that the sale of rosewood is being used to finance Madagascar’s 
‘democracy’. It would be interesting to investigate the reasons 
behind the closing of forests to logging following elections. 
Such an investigation would need to include an analysis of the 
links between forest protection and the allocation of donor 
support for conservation projects.
The Madagascar judiciary: In the context of Madagascar’s 
constantly changing and frequently contradictory legislative and 
regulatory environment, the judiciary system is at great pains 
to apply the law. The hierarchy (slightly simplified) of official 
documents in Madagascar is as follows: Constitution, law, ordi-
nance, decree, inter - ministerial order, order, note or decision, 
memorandum, communiqué. Yet the widely accepted princi-
ple that lower level documents can not contradict higher level 
orders is frequently violated in Madagascar. Two examples:
• Interministerial Order No. 003 / 2009 of 28 January 2009 
[Figure 1] stipulates in Article 6: “The liquidation of the 
stocks (…), shall be completed no later than 30 April 
2009. After this period, no exemption will be granted 
(…)”, yet Decision No. 338 / 09 / MEF / MI of 30 July 2009 
states the opposite: “An export quota of 25 containers 
of rosewood is assigned to each of the 13 operators in 
the ministerial decree No. 003 - 2009 (...)”.
• Interministerial Order No. 38244 / 2009 of 21 September 
2009 [Figure 1] requires in Article 14 that “(…) the liqui-
dation of stock authorized is to be completed before 
30 November 2009 [Figure 1]. After this period, the 
rosewood from the region of SAVA and that of Analan-
jirofo may under no circumstances be exported”, yet 
Note No. 218 - PM - SP.09 of 31 December 2009 states 
the opposite: “From the date of signature of this note, 
operators who have already fulfilled conditions stipu-
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lated in the Interministerial Order before 30 November 
2009 [Figure 1], in accordance with conditions deter-
mined by the Interministerial Order No. 38244 of 21 
September 2009 [Figure 1] concerning the export of 
precious woods (inventories, approval, payment of 
royalties, taxes and fines ...), can proceed with the 
preparation and shipment of sending their containers 
of rosewood.”
There are numerous other examples of such contradictions, 
starting with the Constitution itself, which legislation and regula-
tions have shamelessly violated for years:
• Preamble to the Constitution: “Recognizing the impor-
tance of the exceptional wealth and distinctive nature 
of the fauna, flora and mineral resources with which 
nature has endowed Madagascar and the importance 
of preserving it for future generations; (…)”; Article 
39: “All persons have an obligation to respect cultural 
values, public property and the environment. The 
State and decentralised local authorities guarantee 
the preservation, protection and valorisation of the 
environment through appropriate measures.” 
It should be noted that respect for Madagascar’s Constitution is 
only a formality at present, even though text continues to appear 
in the introduction to decrees and other official documents. A 
judge cannot reasonably be expected to condemn someone 
accused of an offense under the forestry law when the legal 
basis of the relevant texts is so pliable. Of the 23 exporters 
mentioned above, 13 have already been brought before a court 
on accusations of crimes related to forest exploitation, yet only 
two were convicted while the others were released, apparently 
due to lack of sufficient evidence.
The ruling elite: The weakness of Madagascar’s central 
power and its poor governance have been highlighted by many 
authors. Roubaud (2001: 12 and 15) writes: “The disappointment 
of the public concerning the benefits of the transition is primarily 
motivated by the behaviour of newly-elected officials who see 
electoral competition as a way to harness public resources (the 
diversion of funds is one of many examples of this trend)”, and 
“Contrary to accepted belief, the main obstacle to the develop-
ment of Madagascar does not lie in the excesses of public regula-
tion, but in its chronic poor administration. Malagasy democracy 
is ill – not the constituents, but the state and its elites”.
Attention was drawn to the forestry sector by Mercier 
(2006), who described the application of forestry policy and 
regulations as being hampered by institutional weaknesses 
and serious problems in governance. More generally, an abun-
dance of natural resources promotes corruption in countries 
where its institutions have a low level of democracy because 
it encourages leaders to favour sources of guaranteed income 
(Bhattacharyya and Holder 2009). Angeles and Neanidis (2009) 
evaluated the critical role of the local elite in effectively eliciting 
foreign aid in developing countries. There is a greater likelihood 
of misusing aid if the ruling class has significant economic and 
social power along with little regard for the lower classes, and 
if the ratio of European settlers to the indigenous population 
was high during the colonial period (Angeles and Neanidis 2009). 
Madagascar clearly suffers from some severe handicaps.
The GW and EIA (2009) report spells out examples of poor 
governance and corruption. According to a report by the Task 
Force (Rasoloson Fanomezana 2008 cited in GW and EIA 2009), 
Minister Bernard Koto personally intervened on the part of the 
companies Bezokiny Christian Claude, Ste Thunam Roger et Cie, 
and Ets Ranjanoro, which led to uncomfortable situations for 
certain MEF officials. According to MEF’s Director of Compliance 
and Integrity Improvement (DCAI), an officer of the Water and 
Forest Department was involved with each violation uncovered. 
Indeed, the temptation is great for a poorly - paid civil servant to 
benefit personally from his / her position’s power to authorize 
access to forest natural resources, either for firewood or timber 
(Brinkerhoff 1996). Corruption runs through all government 
departments involved in rosewood: MEF, the Gendarmerie and 
Police, the Ministry of Justice, transporters, village chiefs, and 
mayors of urban centres. This is echoed in a 26 June 2007 World 
Bank report, which indicates that weak institutional capacity and 
poor governance diminished the commitment of the Govern-
ment of Madagascar during the first half of the Environmental 
Program II (1998 - 2002). Logging permits were allocated, taking 
advantage of the fact that the boundaries of protected forests 
were as yet not geo - referenced nor delimited on the ground. 
The act iv i t ies of  the MEF in January 2008 are 
worth careful scrutiny: Three notes were signed on the 
same day, 10 January 2008 (01 - 08 / MEEFT / SG / DGEEF, 
0 2  -  0 8  /  M E E F T  /  S G  /  D G E E F  /  D R V N  /  S A D G ,  a n d 
03 - 08 / MEEFT / SG /DGEEF), cancelling all logging permits and 
authorizations for timber export. A few days later, on 29 January 
2008, the same minister signed two additional notes, one of 
which set new requirements for obtaining export approval (note 
No. 086 / 08 / MEEFT / SG / DGEEF / DVRN) and another internal 
note (No. 005 / 08 - MEEFT / Mi) stating that export licenses 
were still suspended. Seen from the perspective of operators, 
it appeared that the Minister Harison Randriarimanana was 
encouraging loggers to perpetrate acts of corruption to protect 
their investments, as their products were now subject to confis-
cation in Antalaha and thus in jeopardy since these ministerial 
notes were issued (Anonymous 2008b).
The proliferation and inconsistency of regulations in this 
arena during more than a decade effectively paralyzed justice 
and encouraged impunity on the part of unscrupulous exporters. 
We believe there is in fact an organized movement (collective, 
predetermined behaviour over several years) whose purpose 
is to stimulate and sustain the activities of the ruling elite. The 
response of exporters to the proliferation of memos in January 
2008 seems to indicate that their preferred option was to try to 
reverse any decision not in their favour by means of corrupt-
ing the authorities. This was done by attempting to convince 
policy-makers based in the capital that their decisions were 
inappropriate and counter-productive, and that they encourage 
foreign competition. The unstable nature of the forestry regula-
tions is the result of decisions made at the highest governmental 
levels, giving those holding power at the central and regional 
levels in each department the opportunity to negotiate and cut 
a deal. This applies, for example, to State responses to natural 
disasters, preparations for elections, improving the balance 
of payments, the prestige of personal influence and efforts to 
increase votes for a chosen candidate.
China and U.S. Lacey Act: The stringent measures imple-
mented by the Chinese government to stop environmental 
disasters in its own country have had serious repercussions 
on the rest of the world. Since China banned logging in its 
own forests in 1998, imports of timber have increased six - fold, 
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making it second only to Japan in purchases from countries with 
tropical rainforests. By actively protecting their own forests and 
thereby “exporting deforestation” (Liu and Diamond 2005), China 
and Japan are wreaking havoc in places such as Malaysia, Papua 
New Guinea, Australia, and now Madagascar.
Records of Chinese imports show that the main suppli-
ers of rosewood in 2008 were Myanmar (41,000 tonnes) and 
Mozambique (27,000 tonnes) (James Hewitt In litt.). However, 
our sources are unsure that the rosewood reportedly exported 
by Mozambique in fact came from that country: Madagascar, 
located just across the narrow Mozambique Channel, exported 
around 36,000 tonnes in 2009. It is both interesting and impor-
tant to note that Chinese customs records indicate only 1,000 
tonnes of logs as originating from Madagascar in 2008, while 
the amount of rosewood exported from Madagascar that year 
reached almost 14,000 tonnes. China has always been the major 
buyer of Malagasy rosewood (e.g., 98 %  about a decade ago, 
Stasse 2002) and in 2009 almost 100 %  of exports were shipped 
there. As long as countries such as China use customs codes 
that do not allow transparency of imports and origins, it will 
remain almost impossible to track the rosewood trade accu-
rately. In this regard, the United States has been exemplary in its 
implementation of the Lacey Act, which prohibits the import of 
illegally sourced timber. The aim of this act is to shift part of the 
responsibility to the US as an importing country rather than leav-
ing it entirely in the hands of the exporting / source country.
The donors: Madagascar’s unique and threatened 
biodiversity has, for more than two decades, made it a high 
priority for the international conservation and development 
community. Donors congregated in Madagascar in 1991 for a 
Multi - Donor Secretariat (MDS), representing the International 
Non - Governmental Organizations (INGOs) – Worldwide Fund 
for Nature (WWF), Conservation International (CI), Wildlife 
Conservation Society (WCS) – and Agencies for Development 
of the countries concerned (France, Germany, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland and USA), plus the United Nations and the World 
Bank. Over $ US 320 million has been invested by members of 
this community. Yet the silence of the donors and INGOs during 
2009, when efforts made over many decades to protect natural 
assets quickly collapsed, is puzzling. Where are the results of the 
massive financial aid they channelled into the country? When 
President Ravalomanana stepped down on 17 March 2009, the 
international community responded by immediately suspending 
all financial assistance, except some humanitarian aid. Lenders, 
donors and the INGOs suddenly found themselves deprived of 
any leverage, which proves that their influence was only finan-
cially driven – no more money means no more influence.
The Malagasy State depends on international assistance, 
and even more so for the funding of the National Environmental 
Action Plan, which relies on foreign funding for more than 80 % 
(Rabesahala Horning 2008). The donor institutions and INGOs 
left the door wide open for the logging syndicate to lobby those 
in power and to do so successfully. Given the near - complete 
silence of the INGOs, there is growing international sentiment 
that the donors might not appreciate the lack of tangible results 
for their support and there is also concern that the INGOs actu-
ally have had a corrupt interest in minimizing the gravity of 
the forestry crisis in 2009, lest their funds dry up. According to 
Rabesahala Horning (2008), the local elite treat aid as an “annu-
ity” – a “mass of money” that is automatically due to the country 
because of the “uniqueness of Madagascar’s biodiversity on a 
global level”.
IMPACTS. Impact on parks: For several months
during 2009, thousands of people were involved in logging 
rosewood and ebony in the protected areas of the SAVA and 
Analanjirofo regions. The logged portions of the Masoala Park 
amount to approximately 4,000 hectares – less than 2 %  of its 
total area (230,000 hectares). But logging is not concentrated at 
one particular site, nor do these sites constitute small islands: 
they are selected according to two criteria: (1) Abundance of 
large rosewood trees (i.e., undisturbed forest below 400 m, 
Humbert 1965); and (2) ease of evacuating logs (i.e., proxim-
ity to a watercourse). Almost all lowland rainforest in valleys 
near Marojejy has thus been logged. Moreover, logging was 
not limited to Dalbergia trees: Five times as many lightweight 
trees (mostly Dombeya spp.) were felled in order to float the 
heavy rosewood (and ebony) logs, and innumerable lianas were 
cut to bind the logged trees to make rafts. Lianas play a key 
role in ecological interactions, especially in the tropics: 75 %  of 
rainforest fauna lives in the canopy (Hallé 2009) and lianas are 
needed by many species to move around the forest. Additional 
impacts resulted from the many tracks that were created to haul 
logs to the nearest rivers. Other trees of random species were 
felled to facilitate access to rosewood trees or to help trans-
port the precious timber through very rough terrain. Temporary 
camps were established deep in the forests to accommodate 
several hundred loggers, dramatically increasing the need for 
firewood and bushmeat (in particular mammals and birds) and 
adversely affected the protected areas in the SAVA and Analan-
jirofo regions. A guide returning from a hike with a tourist and 
a student in Masoala on 18 July 2009 reported the presence of 
thousands of people actively logging in the park. Some were 
transporting trees, others stacking logs. These observers noted 
that the forest was almost stripped bare and wildlife had disap-
peared. A local resident confessed to poaching 26 lemurs in a 
two week period (Andriatahina and Rakotondrabe 2009).
According to Stasse (2002), a decade ago three tonnes of 
rosewood were easily felled in a day by a team of three to six 
loggers. By 2002, the same team were unable to find more than 
a single log per day, and in 2009, they were cutting trees as small 
as 10 cm in diameter, well before reaching reproductive maturity. 
Moreover, seedlings and young saplings are damaged or killed 
when harvested trees are felled and transported. Instead of 
being managed, the resource is being pillaged.
Peripheral damage from selective logging includes 
the loss of genetic diversity (Gillies et al. 1999, Brown and 
Gurevitch 2004), an increase in the risk of fire in cut areas 
(Cochrane and Schultze 1998, Cowlishaw and Dunbar 2000), 
destruction of habitat and the demise of wildlife (Ganzhorn et 
al. 1990), and a decrease in the number of endemic species 
(Irwin et al. 2010). Unfortunately, it is not possible yet to assess 
and quantify the full range of impacts caused by the intrusion 
of thousands of illegal loggers into the National Parks.
Socio - economical impact: The most significant economic 
consequence of the prolonged, selective logging in Madagas-
car has been a marked decrease in ecotourism during 2009. 
According to the National Tourism Office, the number of visitors 
declined 56 %  compared to the previous year (i.e., to just 162,687 
arrivals, World Bank 2010), and income from tourism decreased 
from $ US 465 million to $ US 180 million. Madagascar’s tourism 
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industry annually brings nearly a half-billion US dollars to tens 
of thousands of people involved in all aspects of the industry 
(hotel and restaurant staff, guides, drivers, taxi operators, boat 
skippers, artisans and more). By contrast, the illegal high - end 
timber industry has resulted in a one-time windfall of an esti-
mated $ US 220 million (Table 2) for just twenty - three individu-
als and a smattering of minor payments to a limited number 
of other players involved. 
As the eco - tourism industry continues to decline in tandem 
with the degradation of the forests and of security, the very 
image of Madagascar itself has been severely tarnished. Those 
with some common sense have just cause for alarm: More than 
just logs of rare timber are leaving the country – jobs, livelihoods 
and reputations are at stake. On several occasions over the past 
decade, the government has banned the export of unprocessed 
precious wood (i.e., in the form of logs). According to Global 
Witness (GW and EIA 2009), a large rosewood cabinet sells in 
China for between $ US 18,700 and $ US 25,000, and a Chinese 
importer would pay $ US 750 to 1,000 for the raw material 
bought from exporters in Madagascar. If a Chinese consumer 
spends $ US 25,000 on a cabinet, then his compatriots involved 
in processing, distribution and importing retain $ US 24,000, 
compared with the $ US 1,000 that accrues to the Malagasy sell-
ers (Table 1). The Chinese interests involved in the industry are 
thus earning nearly 25 times more than their Malagasy suppli-
ers, and 357 times more than the villagers working in Malagasy 
forests, who earn around $ US 67 (Table 1).
Vast sums of money are required to remove large amounts 
of rosewood and ebony from remote forests and transport them 
to stored sites until the administrative situation is favourable 
(which can take years), and then exporting the wood involves 
paying heavy taxes (Table 1). Most exporters simply do not 
have the necessary funds themselves, so they resort to ingen-
ious ways to circumvent making payments or to reduce the 
amounts they have to pay. For example, some exporters have 
diverted funds provided by the BOA that should have benefit-
ted the vanilla industry, and it is thus hardly surprising that the 
price of Malagasy vanilla was particularly low in 2009. This is 
not just a consequence of the law of supply and demand nor 
the minimum prices set by Ministers ($ US 27 per kilogram in 
2009), but rather a lack of motivation on the part of farmers 
to produce good quality vanilla in sufficient quantities. If the 
exporters of rosewood – most of whom also export vanilla – tell 
producers that they will buy little or no vanilla in a particular 
year, thereby making farmers aware of an impending plunge 
in the price of vanilla, the farmers will naturally go into the 
forests to cut rosewood, because they know there will be firm 
orders and guaranteed prices that are far more attractive. This 
is precisely how the timber exporters corralled their workforce: 
Through economic coercion they deliberately forced people 
who would ordinarily have been involved in the vanilla industry 
into the illicit rosewood industry.
Another noticeable consequence of illegal rosewood 
exploitation has been the closure of schools in remote villages, 
particularly around Marojejy National Park. This results directly 
from the economic ills suffered by the local communities, princi-
pally because of the low (fixed) price of vanilla, which has made 
it impossible for villagers to afford school fees or pay teachers’ 
salaries. So the schools are closed, at least temporarily, and 
the children are sent to work the rice fields because they must 
eat every day. A new generation of woodcutters thus grows up 
lacking education, ignorant of the world around them.
CONCLUSION
For more than ten years, Madagascar’s rosewood industry has 
followed what has now become a regular cycle:
1. Under the influence of environmental donors (who 
must demonstrate visible results during the lifetime of 
their projects), the government enacts sound forestry 
legislation and takes restrictive regulatory measures, 
but it does this without having the capacity, human OR 
moral, to apply them;
2. Since export of precious timber is illegal, rosewood 
loggers accumulate stocks, either discretely or overtly, 
as is currently the case in Vohemar and Antalaha, 
where there are numerous rosewood caches. The law 
is publicly disregarded, officials charged with its appli-
cation are disoriented, and the authority of the State 
is weakened; 
3. Taking advantage of an external event such as a 
cyclone, an election, or a difficult political transition, 
lobbying by the logging syndicate is heard and acted 
upon by the governing class, which then issues a 
series of orders authorising the exceptional one - time 
export of the stockpiled wood (examples: 2000, 2004, 
2005, 2007, 2009), apparently without the possibility of 
later exemption (although we note that the number of 
examples clearly illustrates many exemptions);
4. Logging companies export massively, attempting, often 
with success, to involve members of the governing 
class in their business;
5. Once the donors raise their voices, there is a (tempo-
rary) return to Phase 1.
It is important to note that illegal exploitation continues 
throughout the entire cycle, as the government only really 
controls the export process (i.e., from the loading of contain-
ers on board a ship in port to its departure). Timber export-
ers accumulate stocks while waiting for a favourable phase in 
the cycle, a process that will almost surely continue until the 
resource is totally depleted. For some, the forest is a refuge of 
unique biodiversity, while for others it is simply an adjustable 
budgetary variable. And for others still, it is a source of personal 
enrichment. 
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